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POlYGRAPH EVIDENCE
Paul C. Giannelli

Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
In State v. Sims, 52 Ohio Misc. 31 (C.P. Cuyahoga
Cty. 1977), Judge Hitchcock, in granting a petition for
post-conviction relief, held that a criminal defendant
had a right to have polygraph evidence admitted
under certain circumstances. The Sims court rested
its decision on two grounds: First, the court found the
polygraph had attained a sufficient measure of reliability to warrant the introduction into evidence of
the results of an examination conducted by a competent examiner. Second, the court held that the
defendant had a constitutional right to have polygraph evidence amittted in his behalf. This article
examines the constitutional and evidentiary issues
surrounding the admissibiiity of poiygraph evidence.
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
Ohio has adopted the majority view with respect to
the admissibility of scientific evidence. Before such
evidence may be admitted, the proponent must
establish that the forensic technique has "gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs." This "general acceptance" test is derived
from Frye v. United States, 54 U.S. App. D.C. 46, 293
F. 1013 (1923), the first reported case on the polygraph. The Frye court stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery
crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficultto define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery,the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
/d. at 1 014. The court went on to hold that the
polygraph had "not yet gained such standing and
scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities ... " to warrant admission into
evidence. ld See generally C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 203 (2d ed. 1972).

The "general acceptance" test has been used in
Ohio as the standard for determining the admissibility of a variety of scientific techniques. State v.
0/derman, 44 Ohio App. 2d 130, 336 N£2d 442
(Cuyahoga Cty. 1975) (voiceprints); State v. Holt, 17
Ohio St.2d 81, 85, 246 N.E.2d 365,367, (1969)
("Neutron Activation Analysis has not yet reached
the point of generally proven reliability .... ")The
"general acceptance" test has also been employed in
a number of polygraph cases. State v. Towns, 35 Ohio
App.2d 237, 64 Ohio Ops.2d 371, 301 N.E.2d 700
(Franklin Cty. 1973) ("lie detector test has not yet
attained scientific acceptance."); State v. Hill, 40
Ohio App.2d 16, 69 Ohio Ops.2d 9, 317 N.E.2d 233
(Montgomery Cty. 1963) (polygraph has not received
"scientific recognition"); State v. Smith, 113 Ohio
App. 461, 463, 18 Ohio Ops.2d 19, 178 N.E.2d 605
(Lucas Cty. 1960) ("lie detector has not yet attained
scientific acceptance"); Parker v. Friendt, 99 Ohio
App. 329, 338, 59 Ohio Ops. 112, 118 N.E.2d 216
(Cuyahoga Cty. 1954) (polygraph inadmissible because of lack of "general scientific recognition and
public acceptance.")
The general prohibition of polygraph evidence also
extends to references at trial concerning the fact that
a witness has taken a polygraph examination and to a
witness' willingness or refusal to take an examination. State v. Hegel, 9 Ohio App.2d 12, 38 Ohio
Aps Ops.2d 25, 222 N.E.2d 666 (Montgomery Cty.
1964) ("Neither a professed willingness nor a refusal
to submit to such a test should be admitted"); State v.
Smith, 113 Ohio App. 461, 18 Ohio Ops.2d 19, 178
N.E.2d 605 (LucasCty. 1960).Seegenerally, Annotation, Propriety and Prejudical Effect of Comment or
Evidence as to Accused's Willingness to Take Lie
Detector Test, 95 A.L.R.2d 818 (1964).
Admissibility by Stipulation
The total exclusion of polygraph evidence has
come under attack in recent years. The most significant inroads have occurred in cases in which the parties have stipulated to the admission of the results of
a polygraph examination. In State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz.
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274, 371 P.2d. 894 (1962). theleading stipulation
case, the Arizona Supreme Court found the polygraph had "developed to a state in which its results
are probative enough to warrant admissibility upon
stipulation." 371 P.2d at 900. The same result was
reached in State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis.2d 730,216
N.W.2d 8 (1974), in which the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held the polygraph had attained."such degree
of standing and scientific recognition that unconditional rejection of expert testimony based on polygraph testing is no longer indicated." 216 N.W.2d at
13. See generally, Annotation, Admissibility of Lie
Detector Test Taken Upon Stipulatiortthatthe Result
be Admissible in Evidence, 53 A.L.R.3d 1005 (1973).
Ohio case law on this point is sparse. In State v.
Hill, 40 Ohio App.2d 16, 69 Ohio Ops. 9, 317 N.E.2d
233 (Montgomery Cty. 1963), the court rejected the
admissibility of polygraph evidence upon stipulation.
In a later case, State v. Towns, 35 Ohio App.2d 237,
64 Ohio Ops.2d 371, 301 N.E.2d 700 (Franklin Cty.
1973), the court took the opposite position: "(W)here
the parties stipulate in writing to take such tests and
be bound, thereby, and where, pursuant to such
stipulation, such test is properly given, the results of
such tests are admissible at trial." 35 Ohio App.2d at
246. Dictum in In re Collins, 20 OhioApp.2d 319,49
Ohio Ops.2d 448, 253 N.E.2d 824 (Cuyahoga Cty.
1969), supports ihe Towns decision. in Coiiins the
court stated: "(L)ie detector tests are ordinarily inadmissible absent knowing agreement as to admitting the test by both sides." 20 Ohio App.2d at 322.

fitness of the defendant for such examination, and
the methods utilized in conducting the tests." /d. at
124. See also United States v.lnfelice, 506 F.2d 1358
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975);
United States v. Penick, 496 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir.
1974); United States v. Chastain, 435 F.2d 686 (7th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349,
1360 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Watts, 502 F.2d
726 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Alvarez, 472
F.2d 111 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973).
Prior to Sims, only one other reported Ohio case
admitted polygraph evidence absent a stipulation
betwe_er. the parties. In State v. Hancock, 71 Ohio
Ops.2d 458 (C.P. Hamilton Cty. 1974), the court
admitted the results of a polygraph examination after
concluding that the "time has come to recognize that
the wholesale exclusion of lie detector tests results
for want of scientific acceptance and proved reliability is not supported by the facts." /d. at 466.
Constitutional Arguments
Several constitutional grounds have been offered
to support the admissibility of polygraph evidence. In
State v. Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 532, P.2d 912 (Ct. App.
1975), aff'd. 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975), a
New Mexico appellate court held the admission of
polygraph evidence was required by the due process
clause. The Dorsey opinion relies on Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), in which a state's
evidentiary rules - precluding a party from impeaching its own witness and excluding declaratjons
against penal interests as a hearsay exception operated to prevent the introduction of defense
evidence. According to the United States Supreme
Court, such a result violated due process: Under the
Chambers rationale, a defendant has a right to
present critical and reliable defense evidence. Dorsey merely applied Chambers to the polygraph.
To the extentS1ins recognizes a constitutional right
to present polygraph evidence, it follows Dorsey. The
Sims court, however, relied on the confrontation
rather than due process clause. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have compulsory process for obtail}!ng
witnesses in his favor . . . ". This right has been
applied to the states_ through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1967). In addition, Section 10, Article I
of the Ohio Constitution reads: "In any trial. in any
court, the party accused shall be allowed ... to have
compulsory process to procure the attendance of
witnesses in his behalf . . . " Based upon these
provisions, the Sims court held that a criminal
defendant, at least in certain cases, "has a right to be
examined by a competent, experienced polygraph
operator whose reputation for truth and veracity is
unblemished, and if the examiner is able to reach a
conclusion which favors the defendant's view of the
issues, to have compulsory process for his testimony
as a witness." 52 Ohio Misc. at 42. Support for this
position can be found in the Supreme Court's decision in Washington in which Chief Justice Warren
wrote: 'The right to offer the testimony of witnesses,
and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in

The Trend Toward Full Admissibility
Some courts have gone beyond the stipulation
cases and admitted the results of polygraph
examinations in the absence of a pretrial agreement. In United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90
(E.D. Mich. 1972), for example, a federal district
court found the theory of the polygraph "sound" and
the results of an examination admissible under
certain conditions. Similarly, in People v. Cutter, 12
Crim. L. Rep. 2133 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972), the court
admitted polygraph evidence during a suppression
hearing after finding the "polygraph now enjoys
general acceptance among authorities, including
psychologists and researchers . . . as well as
polygraph examiners." /d. at 2134. Other cases
admitting polygraph evidence include: State v.
Watson, 115 N.J. Super. 213,278 A.2d 543
(Hudson Cty. 1971) (admissible for sentencing);
Walther v. O'Connell, 72 N.Y. Misc.2d 316,
339 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Queens Civ. Ct. 1972); Matter
of Stenzel, 71 Misc.2d 719, 336 N.Y.S.2d 839
(Niagara Fam. Ct. 1972).
In addition to the above cases, several appellate
decisions have indicated that a trial court has discretion to admit or reject polygraph evidence. The
leading case on this issue is Commonwealth v. A
Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120 (Mass. 1974), in which the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held polygraph evidence admissible if: (1) the defendant
agrees in advance to the admission of test results,
irrespective of the outcome of the examination, and
(2) the trial judge conducts a "close and searching
inquiry into the qualifications of the examiner, the
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submit to testing in which an effort will be
made to determine his guilt or innocence on
the basis of physiological responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and
history of the Fifth Amendment.
/d. at 764. Thus, counsel must advise the defendant
concerning the waiver of the privilege if the test
results are to be admitted at trial. Some courts have
required Miranda warnings to ensure that the defendant's waiver is voluntarily, knowingly, and-intelligently made. United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp.
90, 97 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Commonwealth v. A
Juvenile, 313 N.E. 120, 127 (Mass. 1974).

plain terms the right to present a defense ... "/d. at
19. Thus, once the results of polygraph examinations
are found to be reliable, the accused has a constitutional right .to "present a defense" in the form of a
polygraph examiner.
A different constitutional argument was offered in
United States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp. 522 (E.D.N.Y.
1971 ). In Hart a federal district court ruled results of
a polygraph examination of a government witness
which indicated deception were admissible under
the Brady doctrine. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), the United States Supreme Court held the
withholding of favorable and material defense evidence by the prosecution after it had been requested
by the defense violated due process. The Hart court
interpreted Brady as requiring the disclosure of
"any evidence which may tend to exculpate the
defendant." 344 F. Supp. at 523. Because the government initially thought the polygraph sufficiently
reliable to conduct an examination of its witness, it
had the burden, according to the court of explaining
why the test results should now be excluded. Hart
was subsequently followed in State v. Christopher,
134 N.J. Super. 263, 339 A.2d 239 (1975), which
held the government's administration of a polygraph
test constituted an implied stipulation to admit the
results.

References
A defense counsel who intends to use polygraph
evidence, must be thoroughly familiar with the technique. Some of the better references on the subject
include: J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION (1966); MOENSSENS, MOSES, AND INBAU,
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES (1973)
(Chapter 14); N. ANSLEY (Ed.), LEGAL ADMISSIBILITY OF THE POLYGRAPH (1975); TARLOW, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 19 75: An Aid in

Determining Credibility in a Perjury-Plagued System,
26 HASTINGS L.J. 917 (1975).

Enforceability of Pretrial Agreement
In a few reported cases prosecutors have gone
beyond stipulating to the admissibility of test results
and have agreed to the dismissal of charges if the
defendant successfully passes a polygraph examination. Notwithstanding such an agreement some
prosecutors have initiated proceedings even when
the defendant passed the examination. Several appellate courts have held that the prosecutor is bound
by such an agreement. In State v. Davis, 188 So.2d
24 (Fla. App. 1966), for example, the court found that
the agreement was "(a) pledge of public faith - a
promise made by state officials- and one that should
not be lightly disregarded." /d. at 27. Accord, People
v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 235 N.W.2d 581 (1975);
Butler v. State, 228 So.2d 421 (Fla. App. 1969). This
position is supported by the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Santobel/o v. New York, 404 U.S.
257 (1971), in which the Court reversed the defendant's conviction because the prosecution failed to
keep its part of a negotiated plea agreement. See
generally, Enforceability of Agreement by State Officials to Drop Prosecution if Accused Successfully
Passes Polygraph Test, 36 A.L.R.3d 1280 (1971 ).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Speedy Trial
Defendant does not have to object to setting the
trial past speedy trial limits. The Supreme Court
reiterates the mandatory nature of the speedy trial
provisions (R.C. 2945.71) and holds that when a trial
date is set beyond the 90-day limitation, ·the defendant, on motion, will be discharged. There is no
requirement that the defendant object to the setting
of the late date. This case, however, is to be contrasted with earlier cases where the date first set was
within the proper time and was then continued.
When the defendant did not object in those cases, the
court ruled that discharge was not proper. State v.
Singer, 50 Ohio St.2d 1 03, 362 N.E.2d 1216 (1977).
Burden of Proof- Insanity Defense
Under the provisions of R.C. 2901.05(c)(2), a plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity is an affirmative
defense. A defendant who pleads insanity only has
the burden of going forward with sufficient evidence
to raise that defense. He does not have the burden of
establishing insanity by a preponderance of the
evidence. When the defendant presents sufficient
evidence to raise the defense, the state bears the
burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt
upon every issue necessary to convict the defendant.
Thus, the prosecution must prove defendant's sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Humphries, 51
Ohio St.2d 95 (1977).

Self-Incrimination
The submission by an accused to a state-sponsored polygraph examination implicates the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. The Supreme
Court addressed the fifth amendment aspects of
polygraph examinations in Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966):
Some tests seemingly directed to obtain
physical evidence;' for example, lie detector
tests measuring changes in body function
during interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial. To compel a person to

Alibi Allowed Despite lack of Notice
Trial court was reversed for failing to allow alibi
evidence even though defendant failed to give notice
under Crim. R. 12.1. Because defense counsel acted
in good faith (by giving other notice), prosecution was
not surprised, and alibi was vital to defense, the trial
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court abused it discretion in not finding (as Crim. R.
12.Ldirects), .. thaL''in. tbe. interest .oJ justice such
evidence should be ad.mitted." State v. Smith, 50
Ohio St.2d 51, 362 N.E.2d 988 (1977).

On appeal, the trial court's refusal to consider granting probation becaljse of the def13ndant's failure to
plea bargain was held to constitute an abuse of
discretion. Also, the Court held that the defendant
must be allowed the opportunity to negate elements
of the offense charged even if the questions asked to
elicit such information are leading and even if the
State properly objected to them as such. State v.
Powell, No. 36406, Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. App. (1977).

Auto Search
Police officers were summoned to a parking lot
with information that men inside a particular car
were armed with shotguns: On arrival, the officers
ordered the men out of the car at which time they
were frisked. One of the officers noticed a "bulging"
case in the cc.:r, opened it, and found a revolver.
Defendant admitted ownership and was subsequently indicted for carrying a conc:e<!Je.d yv~apon. fV1.otion
to suppress granted by trail court. State appealed and
Court of Appeals affirmed. Frisking justified under
Terry doctrine but as safety of officers was then
secured, no further justification for search existed.
State v. Khail No. 36128, Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. App.
(1977).

Sentencing Procedure- Probationer's Rights
Under the new Ohio Criminal Code, the sentence
must be pronounced before a defendant can be
placed on probation. Thus, instead of suspending the
impo-sition of the sentence and placing the defendant
on probation, the trial court should pronounce the
sentence suspended and then place the defendant on
probation. The court's failure in this case to provide
written notice of the charges against the defendant,
and its refusal to permit the defendant's mother to
address the court violated due process guarantees
specified in Morrisey v. Brewer as made applicable to
probationers in Gagnon v. Scarpelli. Due process
requires that the probationer be given written notice
of the claimed violation and that he have the opport'unity to be heard in person and to present witnesses.
State v. McKenzie. No. 37749, Cuyahoga Cty. Ct.
App. (1977).

Same or Similar Offense Excluded
Principal ground of appeal in rape case was the
erroneous admission of evidence of similar acts. The
Court of Appeals agreed but declined to reverse on
the harmless error grounds. The case offers an
excellent review of the "same or similar offense"
statute (R.C. 2945.59) and the cases interpreting it.
State v. ~Aiilliarnsl ~Jo. 35847, Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. App.
(1977).

Duress Defense in Prison Escape
Recognized- Voir Dire
In a case of first impression for Ohio, the Court
recognized that, under the proper facts, the defense
of duress is available to a defendant charged with
violating Ohio's escape statute. This defense, however, is limited by a requirement that the prisoner
surrender himself to the authorities as soon as he
has avoided the threatened harm. The Court also held
that when a court itself conducts the voir dire
examination in a criminal case pursuant to Crim. R.
24(A), it is error to refuse counsel the opportunity to
supplement the examination by personal inquiry of
the prospective jurors. State v. Proctor, 51 Ohio
App.2d 151 (1977). Ed Note: See Generally Annotation, Duress, Necessity, or Conditions ot Confinement as Justification for Escape from Prison, 69
A.L.R.3d 678 (1976) ..

Speedy Trial
This case contains a lengthy discussion of speedy
trial, both from a statutory and a constitutional point
of view. The most interesting part deals with time
-computation in situations where there is a nolle
prosequi or dismissal (through prosecutor's fault) of
the indictment followed by reindictment. In such
circumstances, the time awaiting trial under the first
indictment is to be added to the time awaiting trial
under the second indictment. The time between the
first dismissal and the reindictment is not to be
counted if the defendant, during that interval. is
released without bail as no charge is then pending.
State v. Stephens, No. 35247, Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. App.
(1977).
Defendant's Presence During Trial
Only the defendant, and not his counsel, can waive
the defendant's right to be present at trial. Thus,
defendant's conviction was reversed despite the fact
that defendant's counsel and the prosecutor had
stipulated that the trial could proceed in the defendant's absence, and despite the fact that the trial
court later explained what had occurred and asked
the defendant if he objected, which he did not. The
Court found that the such acquiescence did not
clearly indicate that the defendant waived his right to
be present. State v. Cunningham, No. 36153, Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. App. (1977).

Federal Rules of Evidence in Ohio
The Court adopted the principles embodied in
Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5)
which provide that hearsay evidence is admissible,
notwithstanding the absence of a specific exception,
if:
(1) the statement has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness;
(2) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact;
(3) the statement is more probative than
other available evidence which could be
produced through reasonable efforts (there
must be a clear showing of the absence of
other available evidence and a showing of
the necessity of its admission);

Sentencing and Cross Examination
The trial court informed defendant's counsel atthe
pretrial that although a presentence report would be
considered if the defendant plead guilty, the defendant would do some time if he elected to go to trial.
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Defendant's Right to a Lineup
The trial court has authority to order an out-ofcourt lineup on defense motion when, in the exercise
of its discretion, it deems such appropriate. Generally, such a lineup may be appropriate where the
defendant, on timely motion, makes a showing that
eyewitness identification is materially at issue and
there exists in the particular case a -reasonable
likelihood of a mistaken identification which a lineup
would tend to resolve. Berryman v. U.S., 22 Crim. L.
Rep. 2172 (D.C. Ct. App. 1977).

(4) admissibility is clearly in the interst of
justice; and
(5) the offering party notifies the adverse
party of its intention to offer such evidence.
Erion v. Timken Co., 52 Ohio App.2d 123 (Franklin
Cty. 1976). Ed. Note: Timken is one of the first Ohio
cases to adopt a provision of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The residual hearsay exception applied in
Timken permits the trial judge to admit hearsay
statements, not falling within a recognized exception, on an ad hoc basis. Confrontation clause problems would generally preclude the prosecution from
using this exception. The Proposed Ohio Rules of
Evidence also contain this exception.

Bail-Equal Protection Challenge
Pretrial detainees brought an action challenging
Florida's system of imposing bail on pretrial detainees. The Court held that (1) when challenged on
equal protection grounds, Florida's system of imposing bail was subject to close judical scrutiny, (2) a
state may not use bail to prevent the pretrial release
of unreasonably dangerous persons, and (3) equal
protection standards are not satisfied unless the
judge is required to consider less financially onerous
forms of release before he imposes money bail. This
case a Iso contains a •• extensive discussion of bail.
Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1977).

Ohio's Capital Punishment Statute
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the
constitutionality of the Ohio death penalty statute in
January. 22 Crim. L. Rep. 4130: The two cases before
the Court are Bell v. Ohio, 48 Ohio St.2d 270, 358
N.E.2d 556 (1976) and Locket v. Ohio, 49 Ohio St.2d
48, 358 N.E.2d 10'62 (1976). The Ohio Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute in an
earlier case, State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St.2d 73, 357
N.E.2d 1035 (1976). See generally, State v. Bayless,
Discretionary Defects May Still Remain in Ohio's

Right to Counsel at Lineup
A lineup does not end when the suspects file out of
the room. Instead, such an identification procedure
includes the witness' verbal or written assertion of
whatever reaction he had to the viewing. Thus, the
Court held that the 6th Amendment-based rule of
U.S. v. Wade, which guarantees the right to counsel
at a lineup occurring after an indictment or information has been returned, requires that counsel be
allowed to attend the witness-response stage of the
ljneup as well as the viewing itself. State v. McGhee,
350 So.2d 370 (La. Sup. Ct. 1977). Ed. Note: McGhee
follows the decision of the California Supreme Court
in People v. Willaims, 3 Cal.3d 853, 478 P.2d 942
(1971 ).

Death Penalty Statutes, 4 Ohio !Vorthern L. Rev. 701
(1977): Greggv. Georgia: Will the Ohio Death Penalty
Survive?, -4 Ohio Northern L. Rev. 441 (1977).
Right to Counsel at Lineups
A rape victim's one-on-one identification _of an
unindicted defendant at a preliminary heanng at
which the defendant was not represented by counsel
violated the defendant's right to counsel. The right to
counsel under Wade and Gilbert had attached because the hearing took place after the initiation of
adversary judicial criminal proceedings. Moore v.
Illinois, 98 S. Ct. 458 (1977).
Double Jeopardy - Lesser Included
Offense in Municipality
Where the same act or transaction contitutes a
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test
for determining whether there were two offenses or
merely one for purposes of the double jeopardy
clause of the Fifth Amendment is whether each
provision requires proof of a fact which the other did
not. In this case, defendant stole a car and was
arrested after using it for 9 days. Defendant pleaded
guilty to joyriding- the charge being based on the last
day the car was used. Defendant was later charged
with auto theft, a felony, based on the original taking
of the car. Since joyriding is a lesser included offense
of auto theft under Ohio law, the double jeopardy
clause barred prosecution for auto theft. It was
immaterial that the prosecution for auto theft was
based on earlier events since no Ohio statute
provides that joyriding is a separate offense for each
day the car is operated without the owner's consent.
Brown v. Ohio, _ _ U.S. _ _ , 53 L. Ed.2d 187
(1977).

Affidavit for Probable Cause
A negligent misstatement in a search warrant
affidavit renders the affidavit invalid if it would not
establish probable cause without the misstatement.
The Court distinguished between "honest mistake"
and negligent misstatements. Where the affidavit
stated that inspection of suitcases had revealed
marijuana when, in fact, the suitcases had not been
opened, and the basis for detection was the odor
coming from the suitcases, such was a negligent
misstatement which did not establish probable
cause. U.S. v. Astroff, 556 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1977).
Delay of Arrest
There was an 11-month period between the date of
the alleged offense and the date of the defendant's
arrest. In determining whether this delay constituted
a due process violation, the Court did not look solely
to the time period. Several factors must be considered, including the reason the government offers to
justify the delay. The key factor is prejudice to the
accused. No matter how long the delay, it per se will
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not justify dismissal unless the accused can demonstrate that he is prejudiced thereby. Prejudice is
demonstrated where the defendant has no recollection of what he was doing or where he was at the
time of the offense, so as to locate any witness. State
v. Griffin, 347 So.2d 692 (Fla. App. 1977).

defendant to talk. The Court held that such statements should have been suppressed at trial. Miranda
warnings must precede any custodial interrogation
designed to obtain incriminatory statements. Where
the waiver of rights results from the clever softening
up of the defendant through disparagement of the
victim and ingratiating conversation, the subsequent
decision to waive must be deemed to be involuntary.
People v. Honeycutt, 570 P.2d 1050 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
1977).

Discovery-Medical Records of
Prosecution Witness
Since the mental condition of the prosecuting
victim was at issue, the defendant was entitled to
discover medical and hospital records of the witness
when she was a patient at
state hospital. The
interests of justice require the privilege between
patient and psychiatrist be withheld. Various methods which a court could employ to provide such
discovery are discussed. The Court also approved an
in camera inspection of the requested documents to
determine if they had any probative value to the
defendant. State v. Brown, 552 S.W.2d 383 (Tenn.
1977).

a

Miranda Warnings
After his arrest, the defendant was given two
Miranda warnings and he heeded his attorney's
advice not to talk to the police. While in custody,
however, he made incriminating statements to a
guard after the guard assured him that anything he
said would not be used against him. Despite the fact
that such statements were voluntary, possessed
indicia of reliability, and were not the result of any
intentional violation of constitutional standards, the
Court held that adherence to the spirit of various
Supreme Court decisions required that such statements be suppressed. Commonwealth v. Dustin, 22
Crim. L. Rep. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1977).

Impeachment with Prior Convictions
After a lengthy discussion of impeachment with
prior convictions, the Court ruled that evidence of a
prior conviction is not admissible to impeach the
credibility of a criminal defendant except in prosecu'tions for perjury and false swearing. However, use of
prior convictions is proper where the defendant affirmatively introduces evidence of good character.
State v. McAboy, 236, S.E.2d 431 (W.Va. 1977).

Informers-Disclosure of Identity
An FBI agent was not permitted to testify at a
sentencing hearing that two defendants belonged to
a Mafia-like group without disclosing, upon demand
by the defense, the identity of the informer· who
allegedly supplied such information. For the court to
base a critical decision affecting liberty upon information from a person whom the government prevents the defendant from examining, would violate
both the due process and confrontation clauses. U.S.
v. Fatica, 22 Crim. L. Rep. 2286 (U.S.D.C. E.N.Y.
1977).

Handcuffed Defendant

It is error to take a juvenile before the juvenile court
in handcuffs, even though no jury is involved, where
there is no showing of threat of escape or that guards
would not be sufficient. In re Staley, 364 N.E.2d 72
(Ill. 1977) Ed. Note: See also Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501 (1976), in which the Supreme Court held
that compelling a defendant to wear prison garb
during trial violated due process.

Declarations Against Penal Interest
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopts
the approach taken by Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3) with regard to declarations against penal
interest. Under the Federal Rules, a statement against penal interest is admissible provided corroborating circumstances clearly indicate its trustworthiness. Commonwealth v. Carr, 22 Crim. L. Rep.
2241 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1977).

Miranda Warnings
The defendant made incriminatory statements following one-half hour of stationhouse interrogation
during which time the detective talked to the defendant about people they knew, unrelated events, and
the victim. Miranda warnings were then given. By
that time, however, the detective had persuaded the
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